Every offshore wind announcement comes with a factory attached. Turbines go in the water, jobs go in the town, and somebody in a hard hat stands in front of a very large shed for the photographers. Britain’s version of that shed sits on Teesside, cost around \u00a3900 million, and was built specifically to roll the steel tubes that hold up the country’s biggest wind farm.<\/p>\n
It never shipped one to that wind farm.<\/p>\n
In February, \u00d8rsted and SeAH Wind agreed to stop monopile production for Hornsea 3, the 2.9 GW project sitting about 120 kilometers (75 miles) off the Norfolk coast that becomes the largest single offshore wind farm on the planet when it finishes. The tubes are coming from Bilbao and from China instead. The first one went into the seabed on May 14<\/a>, and the other 196 follow through the rest of 2026 and into 2027.<\/p>\n So the interesting question stopped being how big the tubes are. It became who can actually make them, and at what rate. Two companies answered that question in the last five weeks, and they gave opposite answers.<\/p>\n Strip away the vocabulary and a monopile is a pipe. A very large pipe that gets hammered into the seabed until it stops moving, with a turbine bolted on top.<\/p>\n Hornsea 3’s are 90 meters long, which is 295 feet, and weigh an average of 1,670 metric tons apiece, or about 1,840 US tons. They measure 8 meters across at the top and widen to as much as 11 meters at the base, so roughly 26 feet up top and 36 feet down where the seabed is. Those are \u00d8rsted’s own numbers.<\/p>\n \u00d8rsted also supplied the scale comparison, and it is a good one: each tube weighs about the same as nine of the heaviest blue whales, and three of the longest blue whales laid end to end would just about match its length. The company says they are the largest monopiles it has used at any of its European wind farms.<\/p>\n Each one gets topped by what \u00d8rsted describes as a 15 MW turbine. The machine is the Siemens Gamesa SG 14-236 DD, rated at 14 MW before power boost, which is where the extra megawatt comes from. Both figures are correct depending on which spec sheet you are reading.<\/p>\n Haizea Wind Group signed for Hornsea 3 monopiles back in 2022, at the time the largest single contract the Spanish company had won. The first six arrived at Steel River Quay on the Teesworks site in February, having covered 960 nautical miles from Bilbao in two batches aboard BigLift’s CY Interocean II<\/em>.<\/p>\n Luke Bridgman, Managing Director of Hornsea 3, marked the arrival with a line that reads differently now than it did in February: “2026 is the year we begin offshore works on Hornsea 3 in earnest.”<\/a><\/p>\n China’s Dajin Heavy Industry took the other stream. It shipped its first Hornsea 3 monopiles in March aboard King One<\/em>, a deck carrier it built itself and launched in October 2025, on the vessel’s maiden voyage. The thing is 240 meters long, 51 meters wide, rated at 40,000 deadweight tons and carrying 12,000 square meters of deck.<\/p>\n Dajin then told the market in late June, via trade outlet reNEWS, that it had completed its entire manufacturing scope for Hornsea 3, with the last batch already at sea. That is a Chinese supplier finishing a British megaproject order ahead of the installation campaign it feeds.<\/p>\n Nobody has published how the 197 split between suppliers, so anyone telling you it was half Spain and half China is guessing. What is on the record is that when SeAH’s scope came free, trade coverage reported it going to Dajin plus German manufacturers EEW and Steelwind Nordenham. Hold that thought about EEW.<\/p>\n None of this reflects badly on the ambition behind SeAH Wind’s factory, which is genuinely enormous. It runs 810 meters end to end, about half a mile, stands 40 meters tall and 200 meters wide, and was designed to turn out monopiles up to 15.5 meters in diameter, 120 meters long and 3,500 tons. It started as a roughly \u00a3450 million project and doubled to around \u00a3900 million in 2024 as the site grew from 36 hectares to 90.<\/p>\n King Charles opened it in early 2025. Production began that July with the ceremonial cutting of the first steel plates.<\/p>\n Then it got difficult. More than 150 GMB union members walked out in October over pay, roughly 80 percent of the workforce, with the company calling the demands “unaffordable and unrealistic”<\/a> at the time. By February, SeAH and \u00d8rsted issued a joint statement saying they had mutually agreed to discontinue Hornsea 3 production, citing a shared assessment of factory readiness against the project’s requirements. \u00d8rsted said the wind farm’s schedule was unaffected, and the installation campaign starting on time in May suggests it was telling the truth.<\/p>\n It got worse in April. RWE cancelled SeAH’s monopile order for the 1.4 GW Norfolk Vanguard West project while keeping the Vanguard East order, and reporting at the time put the plant on course to cut up to 72 roles, taking headcount from 153 down to 81. Haizea started rolling Vanguard West monopiles in June.<\/p>\n If you want to know what a monopile line looks like when it works, Sif Holding published the numbers last Friday. Sif is not on Hornsea 3, which is exactly why its report is useful: it is the same product, the same customers, the same weather, no shared contract to muddy the comparison.<\/p>\n Sif’s interim 2026 results<\/a> say the new Maasvlakte II plant in Rotterdam hit its planned ramp-up during the first half, averaging four to five monopiles a week. Output reached 141 kilotons against 80 a year earlier, covering 101 monopiles plus primary steel for 14 transition pieces, enough hardware for 1,405 MW of wind capacity.<\/p>\n The financials moved with it. Adjusted EBITDA went from \u20ac12.9 million to \u20ac43.4 million, contribution from \u20ac80.5 million to \u20ac134.7 million, and the loss after tax narrowed from \u20ac25.9 million to \u20ac4.1 million.<\/p>\n The bit that got almost no general coverage came next. Sif also cut its full-year 2026 EBITDA guidance from at least \u20ac135 million to \u20ac95 million, because management chose to push roughly \u20ac40 million of it into 2027. The stated reason is to avoid the cost and risk of ramping a line down and back up between projects, and the underlying problem is that very few offshore wind projects reached final investment decision recently, which leaves monopile demand thin across 2027 and 2028.<\/p>\n That is a company saying it can build them faster than anyone is currently ordering them.<\/p>\n The balance sheet reflects the squeeze. Period-end cash sat at \u20ac7.1 million against \u20ac95.6 million at the end of December, though solvency held at 35.6 percent, leverage at 1.98 times, and a \u20ac50 million revolving facility went undrawn. Sif mandated banks for a Nordic bond issue on June 23 and pulled it on July 1, pointing to market conditions and available terms, and says it is still in discussions with its largest shareholder and its lenders.<\/p>\n The management churn is its own story. Chief Operating Officer Pepijn Timmermans stepped down on June 15 by mutual agreement, with the company stating explicitly that no disagreement over strategy, reporting, governance or outlook was involved, and no successor was appointed. Then on August 1, three days ago, Koen Bogers took over as chief executive<\/a>, succeeding Fred van Beers, who had run Sif since 2018 and stays on as an advisor until January 2027. New CEO, no COO, a pulled bond and a factory finally running at rate, all inside seven weeks.<\/p>\n Remember EEW picking up part of the reallocated Hornsea 3 scope. EEW Group is German, it makes large-diameter steel pipe, and it has been supplying European offshore wind for years.<\/p>\n Its American arm is in bankruptcy court. EEW American Offshore Structures Inc. and affiliate EEW AOS Paulsboro Urban Renewal LLC filed Chapter 11 petitions on April 8, 2026<\/a> in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, case number 26-13901, listing assets and liabilities each in the $10 million to $50 million band.<\/p>\n New Jersey had announced a $250 million commitment to the Paulsboro Marine Terminal in 2020 and billed it as the largest industrial offshore wind investment in the country at the time. The plan was hundreds of workers and more than a hundred monopiles a year out of Gloucester County.<\/p>\n What actually happened was two contracted projects getting cancelled, the terminal operator filing a complaint in Gloucester County Superior Court in October 2025 seeking to evict the company, and labor proceedings pending before the National Labor Relations Board. Those are filings and allegations, not findings, and no court has ruled on them. Court records list around $1.69 million in unpaid rent and the IRS as the largest unsecured creditor at over $2 million.<\/p>\n Then in March the federal government agreed to pay TotalEnergies $928 million to scrap two planned wind farms off New Jersey and North Carolina, which removed most of what was left of the future order book. We covered the wider version of that stall when Britain finished the first phase of Dogger Bank while five nearly complete American projects sat frozen<\/a>.<\/p>\n Cadeler is handling transport and installation for all 197, its first full-scope foundation job, using the purpose-built Wind Ally<\/em> for the monopiles and Wind Orca<\/em> for secondary steel, with the Esvagt Froude<\/em> doing the commissioning. \u00d8rsted says more than 200 experts from the developer plus its contractors Cadeler and Menck, the pile-hammer specialist, are working the campaign.<\/p>\n Once a tube is in the seabed it stops being a supply chain problem and starts being habitat, which is a genuinely strange second life for rolled plate steel and one we followed through seals hunting the turbine rows in the North Sea<\/a>. Different question entirely from what sits on top of the monopile, which is where the yellow transition pieces come in, and we went through those at Inch Cape, a separate Scottish project with its own 54 foundations<\/a>.<\/p>\n The lesson out of Hornsea 3 is not that Britain cannot build monopiles. SeAH’s plant is real, it is still being finished, and it still holds work. The lesson is that a monopile line is a machine, and machines take years to reach rate.<\/p>\n Sif needed a new factory, a ramp-up, a management shuffle and a guidance cut to get to five a week, and it is one of the most experienced fabricators in Europe. SeAH is roughly four years past groundbreaking on the biggest plant of its kind ever attempted and is still not at rate. \u00d8rsted had 197 slots to fill and a 2027 deadline, so it did not wait.<\/p>\n Which is how the foundations of Britain’s flagship wind farm ended up sailing in from Bilbao and from a yard in China. The steel does not care where it was rolled. The schedule does.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Every offshore wind announcement comes with a factory attached. Turbines go in the water, jobs go in the town, and … <\/p>\nA monopile is 1,840 tons of rolled steel and almost nothing else<\/h2>\n
Spain rolled the first six, China finished its share in June<\/h2>\n
The Teesside plant is 810 meters long and still hasn’t found its rhythm<\/h2>\n
The Dutch answer arrived on July 31 and it wasn’t simple either<\/h2>\n
The same German group is winning in Europe and sitting in Chapter 11 in New Jersey<\/h2>\n
Rolling one is easy, rolling 197 on schedule is the whole business<\/h2>\n